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Abstract
We develop a game theoretical model of whistleblowing behavior in organizations, focus-
ing specifically on the role of incentives aimed at encouraging this type of behavior. We also
analyze the potential impacts of whistleblowing behavior on the persistence of corruption.
First, we present a static game consisting of two employees with three available strategies:
honest, corrupt and whistleblowing behavior. Later, we examine the pure and mixed Nash
equilibrium strategies of the game. Second, we use the concept of replicator dynamics to for-
mally explore the local asymptotic stability of whistleblowing behavior within organizations.
Our main results show that whistleblowing as a mechanism to control wrongdoing is only rel-
evant under the existence of external monitoring (if the probability of detecting wrongdoing
with an external mechanism is close to zero, then in the long term, all employees will begin to
behave corruptly). We also show that whistleblowers reduce the minimum wages required to
avoid corruption within an organization, making it less costly for an organization to combat
corruption. Finally, we claim that whistleblowing strategies seem to be less attractive for
activities with very high bribery in comparison to the rewards for whistleblowers, for exam-
ple, this could be the case of manufacturing or retail, but not for financial services in general.
Keywords: whistleblowing, corruption, game theory, replicator dynamics, incentives.
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1 Introduction
Corruption is a persistent feature in human societies, and similar to crime in general, it has
always existed. Thus, corruption has always been an important concern for managerial teams in
all kinds of organizations. Interestingly, most studies that have modeled corruption have focused
on countries and governments, as well as on the use of punishment and surveillance to increase
the expected cost of crime; see (Rose-Ackerman, 1975) for an early work in this topic and (Aidt,
2003) for a lucid survey of the economic literature.
Recently, whistleblowing has become an important monitoring mechanism in the wake of nu-
merous corporate scandals involving accounting firms (Alleyne, Hudaib, & Pike, 2013). The
business community and interested regulatory agencies are now calling for whistleblowing to be
a prominent part of organizational culture.
For instance, in 2010, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) established the
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 included Section 21F (“Se-
curities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections”), which directs the SEC to issue monetary
awards to individuals who voluntarily provide original information leading to successful en-
forcement of monetary sanctions of over $1 million. During 2017 alone, the SEC has ordered
offenders to pay more than $975 million in total monetary sanctions in enforcement matters in-
volving whistleblower information; this amount includes more than $671 million in disgorgement
of profits acquired through securities fraud, which are in turn returned to investors who have
been harmed. Whistleblowers are typically compensated in an amount equal to 10 to 30 percent
of the monetary sanctions collected. In addition to establishing a reward program to encourage
the submission of high-quality information, the SEC has implemented regulations prohibiting
retaliation by firms against employees who have reported possible wrongdoing based on a rea-
sonable belief that a possible securities violation has occurred, is in progress, or is about to occur.
Following the collapse of Arthur Andersen in the Enron scandal, whistleblowing has received
considerable attention, primarily from the ethics literature; since then, business research on
whistleblowing has also started to expand (Alleyne et al., 2013). Nevertheless, from a manage-
ment science perspective, research on whistleblowing behavior has been rather scarce. In this
context, this study aims to contribute by formally investigating the role of whistleblowing in and
potential impact of whistleblowing on the persistence of corruption in organizations, focusing
specifically on the role of incentives aimed at encouraging whistleblowing behavior.
Whistleblowing can be formally defined as the disclosure by organization members (former
or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers to
persons or organizations that may be able to effect action (Near & Miceli, 2016). A recent
example of whistleblowing behavior is that of a Monsanto executive who reported to the SEC
improper accounting at the genetic engineering and pesticides producer Agrocorp. In an article
on the subject, the New York Times reported that “the whistleblower got stymied within the
company” and incurred many expenses since he had to fly to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission headquarters in Washington D.C. many times to assist them and that he finally
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had to leave Monsanto during the course of the investigation1. The whistleblower was reported
to have stated that: “It’s really difficult when your company is doing something you know is
wrong but you’ve got everybody around you saying it’s perfectly fine. . . the Monsanto culture is
very tightknit. Everybody has stock options and everyone is financially at risk. So they go with
the flow”. After the SEC was informed that the company’s accounting practices for its Roundup
herbicides were being used to overstate earnings, Monsanto agreed to settle for $80 million, and
the Monsanto executive earned a $22 million award for blowing the whistle. While this case
illustrates accusations of wrongdoing by an employee to her organization, there are few cases
where an employee blows the whistle on wrongdoing by another employee.
From this business case, we can infer some distinctive elements about how whistleblowing func-
tions in practice. For example, spontaneous whistleblowing behavior can be difficult to initiate in
practice because it implies costly activities and typically garners no economic rewards (Heyes &
Kapur, 2008). The costs of whistleblowing include monitoring and transaction costs associated
with actually reporting corrupt behavior. These costs clearly depend on the number of agents
within an organization that somehow favor the corrupt activities being committed. Indeed, the
monitoring and transaction costs of reporting illicit activities can increase when more people
within an organization support this type of behavior. Thus, one way to approach the problem is
to model corruption as a social norm of behavior assuming that the illicit activities are somehow
accepted by most agents as valid and common practices so that going against them means going
against the majority.
In this study, we present a theoretical model for approaching corruption, focusing specifically
on the role of incentives aimed at encouraging whistleblowing behavior2. We model corruption
as a social norm of behavior using elements of a classic game theory approach and elements of
evolutionary game theory (EGT). For examples, see (Cai & Kock, 2009), (Liu, Liao, & Wei,
2015), (Cheng, Bai, & Yang, 2017), (Anastasopoulos & Anastasopoulos, 2012), (Hellmann &
Staudigl, 2014). Specifically, we use the concept of replicator dynamics to formally explore the
local asymptotic stability of the following types of behavior within an organization: (i) honest
behavior, which implies that an employee does not receive any bribes from illicit activity; (ii)
corrupt behavior, in which a member of the organization does receive bribes from a corrupt
relationship; and (iii) whistleblowing (honest enforcer) behavior, in which an employee not only
behaves honestly, i.e., does not receive bribes, but also monitors other people within the or-
ganization and reports them if they are behaving corruptly. Assuming that an organization
includes three different population shares pursuing these three different behavior types, we use
the concept of replicator dynamics to analyze which of these population shares will become sta-
ble within the organization in the long run. In other words, we formally explore the asymptotic
stability of the noncorruption equilibrium, if all individuals behave honestly, and the corruption
equilibrium, if all individuals within the organization behave corruptly.
In particular, our work adds to the variables of analysis related to the environment for whistle-
1See https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/business/for-monsanto-whistleblower-a-22-million-award-that-
fell-short.html
2For an early and less complete version of this paper, see (Villena & Villena, 2010).
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blowing behavior within organizations in order to provide guidance on how economic instru-
ments aiming to promote whistleblowing behavior should be designed to effectively help break
the stability of corruption. To the best of our knowledge, this work is one of the first studies
to specifically address the impact of economic incentives for whistleblowers and the stability of
corruption. Consequently, in this article, we study what would happen to the stability of cor-
ruption with these instruments in place versus a situation in which they are not. Furthermore,
we analyze the effects of economic incentives on the stability of corruption.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 takes us through the litera-
ture review, section 3 describes the problem of interest, section 4 presents the static game of
whistleblowing behavior, section 5 shows the evolution of whistleblowing behavior using replica-
tor dynamics, and finally section 6 presents some concluding remarks and notes potential topics
for future research.
2 Literature review
As noted above, most studies on modeling corruption have focused on countries and governments,
with the costs and benefits of crime almost being treated like those of a working activity. In
one of the first works on this topic, (Rose-Ackerman, 1975) considered the relationship between
market structure and the incidence of corrupt dealings in the context of government contracting
processes. She noted that it is possible to consider the extent to which various criminal sanc-
tions will deter corruption by revising contracting procedures. The work of (Rose-Ackerman,
1975) and the following works on corruption in economics, criminology and even sociology have
doubtlessly been influenced decisively by the seminal paper of (Becker, 1968).
Indeed, Becker introduced the modeling of individual criminal behavior as a response to in-
centives. An agent decides whether to commit a crime–and how much crime to commit–by
comparing the benefits and costs of crime with those of alternative activities. In Becker’s paper
and its successors, (Ehrlich, 1973), (Block & Heineke, 1975), and (Freeman, 1996), among oth-
ers, the aim is to study to a certain extent how the probability of being caught, the magnitude of
the punishment, the proceeds of criminal activity and the return to work (alternative to crime)
would affect the level of crime. However, the Beckerian model faces agent decisions at a moment
in time where only external control methods exist.
An extension to the literature on crime is the introduction of internal auditing of wrongdo-
ing, for example, through whistleblowers. In this context, some theoretical works have explored
whistleblowing behavior from an economic perspective. (Acemoglu & Jackson, 2017) study how
social norms can constrain the effectiveness of laws that ban certain types of behavior when
laws are in conflict with social norms, with the result being that compliance and enforcement
are weaker.
(Arce, 2010) presents a model based on game theory that elaborates on the expectations and
4
conviction that is symptomatic of a whistleblower as they are preparing for the act of exposing
what they believe to be wrongdoing.
(Søreide, 2008) presents an economic framework aimed at explaining the potential reaction
of multinationals to the loss of a contract because a competitor has offered a bribe.
(Heyes & Kapur, 2008) puts forward a general whistleblower “motivation function”, which relates
individuals’ propensity to blow the whistle to the characteristics of the observed malfeasance
and the enforcement environment, characterizing the optimal policy for three specific cases.
Our work is also related to those of (Lui, 1986), (Cadot, 1987), (Sah & Stiglitz, 1988), (Andvig
& Moene, 1990), (Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1991), (Acemoglu, 1995), (Baker, Gibbons, &
Murphy, 1994) and (Tirole, 1996) in the sense that we also emphasize the self-reinforcing nature
of corruption, implying that the greater the number of people who adhere to corrupt activities
is, the more persistent corruption becomes.
Including whistleblowing behavior in the analysis allows us to consider additional control in-
struments that an organization can use to prevent corruption, going beyond the usual variables
mentioned in the economic literature, namely, the employees’ wage rate, the external monitoring
system, and the penalties for corrupt activities. Some specific questions we attempt to answer in
this context are the following: How can the number of whistleblowers in an organization with an
initially small population of employees who are willing to monitor and report corrupt behavior
be increased? Furthermore, when corruption is already in place as a social norm of behavior in
an organization, how can whistleblowing policies help break the stability of corruption?
3 The model
We consider an organization in which employees display the following types of behavior:
1. Honest.
2. Corrupt.
3. Whistleblowing.
An employee receives a salary of w for her work. Therefore, an honest employee gets paid w. If
an employee commits illicit acts, she receives an amount β for her illicit acts. However, if the
corrupt employee is caught, she is fired, and she can get an alternative job a wage of w0 ≥ 0 and
will pay to the actual firm a penalty of f ≥ 0. The firm may have some whistleblower employees
who monitor others and denounce them when caught in illicit acts. Whistleblowers can detect
wrongdoing behavior with a probability of Θ > 0. However, as discussed in the introduction, it
is difficult for whistleblowing behavior to arise spontaneously since it is a costly activity. The
costs associated with whistleblowing include monitoring costs of m > 0 and transaction costs of
τ > 0 associated with actually reporting wrongdoing.
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We assume that whistleblowing employees are honest. Given that, it is clear that no payoff
maximizer agent will become a whistleblower since this activity only lowers her payoff regard-
less of the behavior of the rest of the employees. In fact, in this case, the whistleblowing strategy
is strictly dominated by the honest strategy since w > w − τΘ − m, so no employee has the
incentive to become a whistleblower. This, in turn, implies that no employee is deterred from
corruption by the threat of whistleblowing behavior from her colleagues.
Because whistleblowing behavior is a dominating strategy, we introduce a reward denoted by
σ ≥ 0 for monitoring the work done by their colleagues and reporting illicit acts. In addition to
whistleblowing behavior among employees, an external mechanism–for example, auditing–can
also detect wrongdoing behavior with probability θ ≥ 0.
Considering a total population of n employees, a proportion of p1 is honest, p2 is corrupt
and p3 is made up of whistleblowers (p1 + p2 + p3 = 1). Each of the p1n honest employ-
ees receives the payoff associated with honest behavior, a wage of pi1 = w. The proportion
of corrupt employees p2n receive the expected payoff associated with wrongdoing activities,
pi2 = (1− θ−p3Θ)(w+β)+ (θ+p3Θ)(w0− f), assuming that corrupt acts can be caught by the
external agency with probability θ or by any of the whistleblowers with probability p3Θ. If she
is not caught, she receives her salary and the bribery payment, and if she is caught, she is fired
and must work in another place and pay the penalty. Finally, each of the p3n whistleblowers
receives the expected payoff of pi3 = w + p2Θ(σ − τ) −m, which is associated with her salary
plus the reward for blowing the whistle less the costs associated with monitoring and reporting.
The average payoff of all employees is p¯i = p1pi1 + p2pi2 + p3pi3.
To study this problem, we first propose a two-player non-cooperative game; subsequently, we
solve the same problem using an EGT approach.
4 The intuition of whistleblowing behavior
The effect of whistleblowing as a mechanism to control corruption within organizations can be
first modeled using non-cooperative game theory. Formally, the n-player game specifies the
players’ strategy spaces S1, ..., Sn and their payoff functions pi1, ..., pin. We denote this game by
G = {S1, ..., Sn;pi1, ..., pin}.
Our game consists of two players, both employees of the firm, denoted by player 1 and player 2.
Each player in this game has three available strategies: to behave honestly, to behave corruptly or
to blow the whistle, represented by S = {H,C,WB}. Table 1 represents the payoffs of the game.
Therefore, we define the game by G = {H,C,WB;piH , piC , piWB}, where piH = (pihh, pihc, pihw),
piC = (pich, picc, picw) and piWC = (piwh, piwc, piww).
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Table 1: Whistleblowing two-player symmetric game
Player 2
H C WB
H pihh, pihh pihc, pich pihw, piwh,
Player 1 C pich, pihc picc, picc picw, piwc
WB piwh, pihw piwc, picw, piww, piww,
Where:
pihh = pihc = pihw = pih = w
piwh = piww = w −m
piwc = Θ(σ − τ) + w −m
pich = picc = (1− θ)(β + w) + θ(w0 − f)
picw = (1− θ −Θ)(w + β) + (θ +Θ)(w0 − f)
Proposition 1 presents the equilibrium analysis of game G.
Proposition 1: Considering the two-player whistleblowing game G described above, we obtain
the following results:
1. There is a unique Nash equilibrium given by the corrupt behavior of both employees {C,C}
whenever picc ≥ piwc.
2. There is a unique Nash equilibrium given by the behavior of one of the employees being
corrupt and the other being a whistleblower {(C,W),(W,C)} whenever picc < piwc and
pihw < picw.
3. The game has a single mixed-strategy equilibrium whenever picc < piwc and pihw ≥ picw.
Proposition 1 shows the existence of a mixed strategy for employees 1 and 2. Three outcomes
are possible depending on the values of the parameters. The game may have a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium defined by an environment of corruption when the conditions in 1 are satisfied.
The game may also present a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of corrupt employees and whistle-
blowers when the conditions in 2 are satisfied. Finally, when the conditions in 3 are satisfied,
a mixed strategy is reached by player i of behaving corruptly when the other player behaves
honestly, behaving as a whistleblower when the other player is corrupt, or being honest when
the other player is a whistleblower.
Proposition 1.1 implies that w ≤ β
θ
− β + m−Θ(σ−τ)
θ
− f − w0, which tells us that if an ex-
ternal enforcing agency does not exist, any organization will have corrupt employees regardless
of the existence of whistleblowers. If we assume that θ > 0, then the role of whistleblowers
becomes relevant since the condition for minimum wages required to avoid corruption within an
organization is reduced by Θ(σ−τ)
θ
.
The conditions in Proposition 1.2 imply that β
θ
+ m−Θ(σ−τ)
θ
< w < β
θ+Θ . Since θ and Θ
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∈ [0, 1], β
θ
> β
θ+Θ , which implies that in order to be true, our inequality must be the case where
Θ(σ − τ) is high enough. Interpreting the result, Θ must have a minimum feasible value and
the reward for blowing the whistle σ must be high.
When the conditions in Proposition 1.3 are met, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium for this
particular game. However, we can find a mixed strategy for employee i probability distribu-
tion of her set of pure strategies (Hofbauer & Weibull, 1996). Let xi denote the probability
assigned by an employee to pure strategy i ∈ S, where S = {H,C,WB}. It should be noted
that xi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i∈S xi = 1. The expected payoff of an employee is given by:
pi(x) = x1pihh + x2[(x1 + x2)pich + (1− x1 − x2)picw] + (1− x1 − x2)[(1− x2)piwh + x2piwc] (1)
Thus, the employee chooses x1 and x2 that maximize equation 1. Solving the first-order condi-
tions, ∂pi
∂xi
= 0, i = 1, 2, the mixed-strategy equilibrium is:


x∗1
x∗2
x∗3

 =


1 + θ(β+f+w−w0)−β+mΘ(β+f−σ+τ+w−w0)
−m
Θ(β+f−σ+τ+w−w0)
θ(w0−w−f−β)+β
Θ(β+f−σ+τ+w−w0)

 (2)
To reach this mixed strategy, pi must satisfy the conditions of probability, which means that
β
θ
+ w0 − f − β ≤ w ≤ σ + w0 − β − f − τ , which is true when σ − τ ≥
β
θ
.
We recover the Beckerian case when there is only an external mechanism that detects wrongdo-
ing, with a unique Nash equilibrium given by corrupt employees if w < β
θ
+ w0 − β − f and a
unique Nash equilibrium given by only honest employees otherwise, meaning that the lower the
probability of catching wrongdoing is, the higher the bribe is, the higher the alternative salaries
are or the lower the penalty when a corrupt employee is caught is, the higher the wages that
must be paid to avoid corruption.
We are interested in studying what happens with our set of optimal solutions (x∗1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3) when
the value of any of the parameters changes, namely,
∂x∗
i
∂a
. Comparative statistical results are
presented in table 2, showing whether the value of the optimal probability increases or not when
there are changes in the parameters that define our problem.
Table 2: Results of the comparative statistics
x1 x2 x3
σ + − −
β + + −
w − + +
θ − no effect +
Θ + − −
An increase in reward σ implies that the incentives for wrongdoing are less attractive, so a per-
centage of corrupt employees will prefer to start behaving honestly. At the same time, as there
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is a smaller proportion of corrupt employees, it is less attractive to behave as whistleblowers,
also decreasing the proportion of whistleblowers. If the bribery β increases, behaving corruptly
is more attractive than being a whistleblower; therefore, a proportion of whistleblowers begin
behaving corruptly, and another proportion of whistleblowers migrate toward behaving honestly.
The introduction of whistleblowers implies a counterintuitive result for salaries since an increase
in w leads to an increase in the corrupt and whistleblowing population. If the external proba-
bility of catching wrongdoing θ increases, only honest employees move toward whistleblowing,
which has no effect on the proportion of employees who behave corruptly. Finally, an increase in
Θ has the same effect as an increase in the reward: it increases honest behavior among employees
and decreases corrupt and whistleblowing behavior.
Apart from the comparative statistical results shown in table 2, we now study the magnitude of
those effects. To do so, we graphically illustrate what happens to the probabilities when each
parameter is varied. Figure 1 shows the movement of probabilities as a function of σ, β and
w. Panel a) shows that increasing the reward for whistleblowing increases the number of honest
employees in the long term while decreasing the number of corrupt and whistleblower employees.
Therefore, the reward becomes an instrument that the firm announces but only actually pays a
few times. Panel b) shows that the bribery β, as expected, increases the probability of behaving
corruptly but also increases the probability of being honest, thereby decreasing the probability
of behaving as a whistleblower. Panel c) shows the change in the probabilities given a change
in salary. The results are counterintuitive, as a change in salary increases the probability of
behaving as a whistleblower but also the probability of behaving corruptly, although the rate of
this change is less than the increase in the number of whistleblowers, and decreases the prob-
ability of employees behaving honestly. Figure 2 shows how the probability of being detected
Figure 1: Change in the probability of behaving honestly, corruptly or as a whistleblower as a
function of parameters σ, β and wages
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impacts the probabilities of being honest, corrupt or a whistleblower. Panel a) shows that when
the probability of an external agency catching corruption increases, the probability of being a
whistleblower increases, and the probability of being honest decreases; however, the probability
of being corrupt is not a function of θ. Panel b) shows that an increase in the probability of
an employee catching wrongdoing implies a decrease in the probability of behaving corruptly or
whistleblowing.
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Figure 2: Change in the probability of behaving honestly, corruptly or as a whistleblower as a
function of the probability of catching corruption
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5 The dynamics of whistleblowing behavior
We now model whistleblowing behavior within an organization with the replicator dynamic
equation, formulating a simple model of evolution and biased learning in games in which suc-
cessful strategies spread by natural selection among a population.
To formalize the replicator dynamic equation, consider an evolutionary game with q pure strate-
gies and stage game payoff piij for any i-player who meets any j-player. If p = (p1, ..., pq) is the fre-
quency of each type of population, the expected payoff for the i-player is then pii(p) =
∑q
j=1 pjpiij ,
and the average payoff in the game is p¯i(p) =
∑q
j=1 pjpii. The replicator dynamic game for our
model is then given by:
∂pi
∂t
= p˙i = pi(pii(p)− p¯i(p)) (3)
The replicator equation 3 expresses the idea that strategies grow among population if they do
better than average. The strategies that do best grow fastest. It is clear that a Nash equilibrium
is a stationary point in the dynamic system. Conversely, each stable stationary point is a Nash
equilibrium, and an asymptotically stable fixed point is a perfect equilibrium.
The replicator dynamics of our model are represented by the two differential equations pre-
sented below:
p˙1 = p1(pi1 − p¯i) (4)
p˙2 = p2(pi2 − p¯i) (5)
The rate of growth of the share of the population using strategies 1 and 2 are proportional to
the amount by which those strategies’ payoffs exceed the average payoff of the strategies in the
population.
10
We are interested in examining the stability of the system since stability is what tells us where the
model converges under certain given conditions to find the conditions that encourage employees
to behave honestly. Our model is nonlinear, and we use the (indirect) Lyapunov’s linearization
method to study the stability of each fixed point. Let p∗1 and p
∗
2 be the fixed points of the
original system, then:
p˙1 = p1
∂p˙1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2)
∂p1
+ p2
∂p˙1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2)
∂p2
(6)
p˙2 = p1
∂p˙2(p
∗
1, p
∗
2)
∂p1
+ p2
∂p˙2(p
∗
1, p
∗
2)
∂p2
(7)
To study stability, we only need to find the eigenvalues of the system presented above, and if
Re(λi) < 0, then (p
∗
1, p
∗
2) is asymptotically stable.
By solving the system p˙1 = 0, p˙2 = 0, we found 5 solutions in which the system converges (fixed
points of the system). The first equilibrium is when all employees in the long term become
whistleblowers, represented by p1 = p2 = 0 and p3 = 1. A second equilibrium is when all
employees in the long term become honest (p1 = 1 and p2 = p3 = 0). The third equilibrium is
when all employees in the long term are corrupt (p1 = p3 = 0 and p2 = 1). The fourth case is
when employees in the long term are either corrupt or whistleblowers, represented by p1 = 0,
p2 > 0 and p3 > 0. The last equilibrium is when the 3 types of employees coexist: honest
employees, corrupt employees and whistleblowers (p1 > 0, p2 > 0 and p3 > 0).
5.1 The stability of only whistleblower employees
By solving equations (6) and (7) with fixed points p∗1 = p
∗
2 = 0, the eigenvalues are λ1 = m
and λ2 = −Θβ −Θf −Θw +Θw0 − βθ − fθ − θw + θw0 + β +m. It is clear that the solution
p∗1 = p
∗
2 = 0 is unstable since λ1 = m > 0, meaning that the solution is unstable regardless of
the values of the other parameters.
Proposition 2: It is a dominant strategy to behave honestly over whistleblowing when there
are no corrupt employees.
Proof: The payoff for an honest employee is pih = w. The payoff for a whistleblower em-
ployee when there is no corrupt population is piw = w −m. Since w > w −m, it is clear that
when there is no wrongdoing, the population will all behave honestly. Proposition 2 makes sense
since if no corruption is detected within the population , a whistleblower only incurs the costs
of monitoring and never receives the reward.
5.2 The stability of the honest equilibrium
Proposition 3: The honest equilibrium (p∗1 = 1, p
∗
2 = 0) is locally asymptotically stable if and
only if w ≥ w0 − β − f +
β
θ
.
This is easy to show. The eigenvalues for p∗1 = 1, p
∗
2 = 0 are λ1 = −m and λ2 = −βθ −
fθ − θw + θw0 + β. Since λ1 < 0, we only need to impose the condition λ2 < 0 in order to get
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a stable fixed point, which is true when w ≥ w0 − β − f +
β
θ
. Thus, efficiency wages w > w0 for
employees, high penalty rates f and a high probability of being detected by an external agency
θ imply significant expected costs of dismissal, so the honest equilibrium will be stable and hard
to break. By contrast, the higher the amount of the bribery β is, the more easily our honest
equilibrium can be broken.
However, the design of a successful external control and monitoring mechanism can be both
difficult and costly. In practice, it may imply a very low θ. If θ → 0 implies that the efficiency
wage w becomes too high and actually very hard to pay, the stability of the honest equilibrium is
easy to break. This may imply that becoming a firm with only honest employees is never achieved
given the importance of a potential equilibrium including a population of whistleblowers.
5.3 The stability of the corruption equilibrium
An environment of corruption occurs when p∗1 = 0, p
∗
2 = 1. In this case, the eigenvalues are
λ1 = βθ+ fθ+ θw−w0θ− β and λ2 = Θσ−Θτ + βθ+ fθ+wθ−w0θ− β−m. The conditions
for employees becoming corrupt in the long run depend on Θ.
Proposition 4: The corruption equilibrium is asymptotically stable if and only if:
1. Whenever Θ ≤ m
σ−τ
and w ≤ w0 − β − f +
β
θ
or
2. Whenever Θ > m
σ−τ
and w ≤ w0 − β − f +
β
θ
+ m
θ
−Θσ−τ
θ
.
The proof of proposition 4 is as follows. To obtain stability, we must impose λ1 < 0 and λ2 < 0.
For λ1, the condition is true if w ≤ w0 − β − f +
β
θ
; however, for λ2, we have 2 cases: 1) when
Θσ − Θτ − m < 0, λ1 < 0 and λ2 < 0 if w ≤ w0 − β − f +
β
θ
. When Θσ − Θτ − m > 0,
we then must impose Θσ − Θτ + βθ + fθ + wθ − w0θ − β − m < 0, which is equivalent to
w ≤ w0 − β − f +
β
θ
+ m
θ
−Θσ−τ
θ
.
Assuming σ > τ , when the probability of catching a corrupt employee is low, Θ < m
σ−τ
, then
wages must be high to avoid corruption. The wage condition is relaxed to some extent (by
m
θ
−Θσ−τ
θ
) when the probability Θ > m
σ−τ
. If the probability of being detected by an external
agency is rather small, the corruption equilibrium will be stable and hard to break. In fact, if
θ → 0, the condition for the local asymptotic stability of the corruption equilibrium is always
satisfied, which implies that whenever corruption becomes a common practice, it will be very
difficult to stop. In the same way, if the amount of bribery, β, and the salary if dismissed, w0,
are high in comparison with w and the penalty for being caught in a corrupt activity, f is low
and the corruption equilibrium will also be stable.
When σ < τ , namely the benefit of whistleblowing, is less than the reporting costs, then it
is always the case that Θ > m
σ−τ
, the minimum salary for employees to not become corrupt
increases. From the conditions, it becomes clear that if the probability of being detected by an
external agency θ is rather small, the corruption equilibrium will be stable and hard to break.
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By contrast, an increase in salaries may break the stability of corruption. This argument dates
back to (Becker & Stigler, 1974) who noted that efficiency wages can be used to control corrup-
tion since they increase the cost of dismissal and, therefore, make employees more reluctant to
accept bribes. Nevertheless, paying high salaries can be very expensive for firms and does not
ensure that corruption will be reduced in all situations.
5.4 The stability of corrupt and whistleblowing employees
This means that in the long run, p∗1 = 0 and p
∗
2 = b, b ∈ (0, 1). In this environment, a firm has
employees that are either corrupt or whistleblowers. In this case, the eigenvalues are given by
λ1 = i− kw and λ2 = j − lw, where:
• i = −Θ(f + τ − w0 + β − σ)b
2 + (Θ(f + τ − w0 + β − σ) + (f − w0 + β)θ −m− β)b+m
• j = −3Θ(f + τ −w0+ β− σ)b
2+((4f +2τ − 4w0+4β− 2σ)Θ+ (2f − 2w0+2β)θ− 2m−
2β)b+ (−f + w0 − β)Θ + (−f + w0 − β)θ +m+ β
• k = b(Θb−Θ− θ)
• l = 3Θb2 + (−4Θ− 2θ)b+Θ+ θ
Proposition 5: The equilibrium of corrupt employees and whistleblowers is asymptotically
stable if and only if Θ > m
σ−τ
and w > w0 − β − f +
β
θ
−Θσ−τ
θ
and if:
1. w > j
l
or
2. w < i
k
.
Proof of proposition 5: First notice that if Θ < m
σ−τ
the replicator dynamic is always asymptot-
ically stable and converges to either all honest or all corrupt employees. If w ≤ w0 − β − f +
β
θ
,
the model converges to the corruption equilibrium when Θ < m
σ−τ
(from proposition 3). If
w ≥ w0 − β − f +
β
θ
, the model always converges to the honest equilibrium, in particular when
Θ < m
σ−τ
. If Θ > m
σ−τ
and w < w0−β− f +
β
θ
−Θσ−τ
θ
, then the model converges to the corrup-
tion equilibrium, so we only need to show stability of the corrupt employees and whistleblowers
when Θ > m
σ−τ
and w > w0 − β − f +
β
θ
−Θσ−τ
θ
. Notice that k < 0 and l > 0.
If λ1 < λ2 ⇒, we need to impose λ2 < 0 ⇒ j − lw < 0 ⇒ w >
j
l
. If λ2 < λ1 ⇒, we
need to impose λ1 < 0 ⇒ i− kw < 0 ⇒ w <
i
k
(remember that k < 0).
Although it is never preferable for an organization to reach the case of only corrupt employees,
the case of only honest employees can be extremely expensive and even impossible to achieve,
in particular when the bribe β is high or when the probability of an external monitoring agency
detecting corruption, θ, is very low. In these cases, for the organization, it may be more efficient
to control corruption but not eliminate it altogether. A firm with only honest employees may
have salaries w ≥ w0 − β − f +
β
θ
. When the firm has whistleblowers and corrupt employees, in
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comparison to the salaries paid when the firm only has honest employees, efficient salaries are
reduced by Θσ−τ
θ
. However, the firm has the additional costs of corruption p2β − f(θ + p3Θ).
Comparing both costs reveals that when p2 ≤
Θ(σ−τ)+fθ(Θ+θ)
θ(β+fΘ) , it is more efficient to allow cor-
rupt and whistleblower employees; that is, the higher the prize for monitoring σ is or the higher
the penalty f when a corrupt employee is detected is, the more likely it is that there is slack for
an increase in the proportion of corrupt employees. On the other hand, the higher the reporting
costs τ is or the higher the payment for her illicit acts β is, the lower the proportion of corrupt
employees the firm may wish to have.
5.5 The stability of honest, corrupt and whistleblowing employees
An environment where honest, corrupt and whistleblowing employees coexist occurs when p∗1 =
a, p∗2 = b, with a, b > 0 and a + b < 1. However, this equilibrium point is not stable. The
model is asymptotically stable under the circumstances described above for an environment of
all honest employees, an environment of all corrupt employees or an environment in which em-
ployees are either corrupt or whistleblowers. Intuitively, this is easy to show since if the reward
for whistleblowing is higher than the cost, then being honest is dominated by whistleblowing.
On the contrary, if the costs of whistleblowing are greater than the reward, then whistleblowing
is dominated by a strategy of being honest. Thus, in the long term, employees can be only
honest, only corrupt, or corrupt and whistleblowers; honest behavior and whistleblowing can
never coexist in the long run.
Figure 3 shows a summary of the phase diagrams for the following cases: a) honest behav-
ior is stable, b) corrupt behavior is stable, c) whistleblowers and corrupt employees become
stable and d) equilibrium is never achieved.
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Figure 3: Phase diagram
6 Concluding remarks and policy recommendations
In this study, we have examined the role of whistleblowing in and potential impact of whistle-
blowing on the persistence of corruption in organizations as a mechanism to control wrongdoing.
In particular, we have modeled the costs and implications of such a policy in the short run and
long run. Our analysis draws some conclusions and recommendations for anticorruption policies
in organizations in the context of whistleblowing behavior.
First, both static and evolutionary game approaches show that whistleblowing as a mecha-
nism to control wrongdoing is only relevant under the existence of external monitoring. When
an external enforcing agency is not in place, the organization will have corrupt employees re-
gardless of the existence of whistleblowers. If the probability of detecting wrongdoing with an
external mechanism is close to zero, then in the long term, all employees will begin to behave
corruptly.
Second, whistleblowers reduce the minimum wages required to avoid corruption within an or-
ganization, making it less costly for an organization to combat corruption. This result shows
that under some scenarios, whistleblowing can be a very effective and efficient way to deter
corruption compared to the more traditional economic view.
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Third, an increase in the whistleblowers’ reward implies that the incentives for wrongdoing are
less attractive, so a percentage of corrupt employees will prefer to start behaving honestly. At
the same time, as there is a smaller proportion of corrupt employees, it is less attractive to
behave as a whistleblower, which also decreases the proportion of whistleblowers. If bribery
increases, behaving corruptly is more attractive than being a whistleblower, and a proportion
of whistleblowers begin to behave corruptly, while another proportion of whistleblowers migrate
toward behaving honestly. These results point to the fact that whistleblowing strategies seem to
be less attractive for activities with very high bribery in comparison to the rewards for whistle-
blowers, for example, manufacturing or retail, but not for financial services in general.
Finally, in the long run, our main conclusion in the context of our strategic environment, is
that honest, corrupt and whistleblowing employees cannot coexist, as this equilibrium point is
never stable. Hence, in the long run, it is possible to envision three scenarios: i) all honest
employees, ii) all corrupt employees or iii) employees being either corrupt or whistleblowers.
The intuition behind this result is that if the reward for blowing the whistle is higher than the
cost, then being honest is dominated by being a whistleblower. On the contrary, if the costs of
blowing the whistle are greater than the reward, then whistleblowing is dominated by a strategy
of being honest.
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